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T he Naga movement forindependence started around
the time India won independence. The
first-ever peacebuilding effort was also
made as early as in June 1947 through
an agreement between the then Governor
of Assam and the Naga National Coun-
cil. The effort however failed to have any
meaningful impact. Thereafter, the Naga
National Council declared independence
and claimed to have conducted a plebi-
scite for independence. The Government
of India rejected such claims on the
ground that India is the legal heir of the
British and hence has legitimate politi-
cal authority over the Nagas. The govern-
ment was willing to give limited au-
tonomy under the constitution of the
country. The Nagas rejected the offer and
boycotted the first parliamentary elections
held in 1951. When the situation dete-
riorated the government sent security
forces to the Naga areas. In 1959, the Naga
People’s Convention adopted a resolution
for the formation of a separate state. It
EXECUTIVE BRIEFING
was communicated to the government and
subsequently became the Sixteen-Point
agreement to elevate Naga Hills-
Tuensang Areas into a state known as
Nagaland. The creation of Nagaland took
place much against the wishes of the pro-
independence groups. In 1974, the
Nagaland Peace Council decided to carry
forward the peacebuilding effort. Hence
another agreement, popularly known as
the Shillong accord, was signed in 1975
between the Government of India and the
“Representative of the Underground Or-
ganisations” when A Z Phizo was the
president of the Naga National Council.
It created a major rift within the Naga
National Council which ultimately led to
its split in 1980 with the formation of
the National Socialist Council of
Nagaland. Less than a decade later, it also
split. Since then the factional strife be-
came intense. Meanwhile, a ceasefire came
into being in 1997 between the Govern-
ment of India and the I C Swu-Th
Muivah-led faction, and separately with
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the Khaplang-led faction since 2001. The
talks have been going on separately with-
out any major breakthrough. Underlying
this upheaval has been a number of is-
sues.
THE ISSUES
Claim for an independent home-
land
The Nagas have been claiming that
their ancestral homeland was an inde-
pendent country in the pre-colonial pe-
riod, and hence wanted it to remain so.
They alleged that their country was
coercively divided by the colonial rulers
and later by India placing them in differ-
ent states. The Naga Club took the first
initiative to bring the Naga people together
under a single political and administra-
tive unit. The task was carried forward
by the Naga National Council which ul-
timately led to the signing of the Nine-
Point agreement. It did not improve the
situation since the parties to the agree-
ment failed to agree on the exact mean-
ing of the agreement. Like other hill ar-
eas the limited autonomy under Sixth
Schedule of the Constitution of India was
suggested by the government. It did not
satisfy the Nagas and hence commenced
the first armed challenge to India. To the
Government of India, this land is an in-
tegral part of the country and hence the
question of independence does not arise.
This claim is based on the British Parlia-
ment’s Indian Independence Act, 1947.
Likewise, the pro-India leaders favoured
a negotiated settlement. Through their
efforts an administrative unit known as
Naga Hills-Tuensang Area was consti-
tuted in 1957 which subsequently el-
evated into the state of Nagaland in 1963.
Integration of the Naga areas
Closely related to independence is the
integration of ‘Naga areas’ into one po-
litical and administrative unit. It is the
key demand of the National Socialist
Council of Nagaland-Isak-Muivah group,
which is considered as one of the most
influential armed groups in the country.
It proposes to call its self-proclaimed
homeland as ‘Nagalim’. According to it,
Nagalim is a nation occupying an area of
about 120,000 sq km which is currently
divided between India and Myanmar. It
maintains that the state of Nagaland is
an ‘Indian-imposed entity’ which falls far
short of their aspirations. The proposed
homeland comprises Nagaland and other
Naga-populated areas of Arunachal
Pradesh, Assam and Manipur (also in-
cluded Naga-populated areas of
Myanmar) which it claims as their ‘right-
ful homeland’. This demand is also as old
as the independence movement itself but
it has intensified in the last two decades.
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The demand has the support of the
Nagaland Legislative Assembly too. How-
ever, the neighbouring states, namely
Manipur, Assam and Arunachal Pradesh
are against the creation of Nagalim if any
parts of their territory are to be taken
away. These states have been apprehen-
sive of the existing ceasefire as the Na-
tional Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isak-
Muivah wanted the extension of its juris-
diction to these states. These states felt
that the extension of ceasefire amounts
to undue interference in their internal af-
fairs. Moreover, the effect of the ceasefire
has been of great concern to Manipur be-
cause a large part of its territory is likely
to be affected if Nagalim is created. The
Nagas have also hardened their stand on
integration by adopting several pressure
tactics.
Factionalism
The Naga movement has also been
marred by factionalism and violence. If
there are the pro-independence groups,
there are also the pro-India groups. The
latter had succeeded the creation of
Nagaland. Nonetheless, the pro-inde-
pendence groups have not been a united
front thus leading to the emergence of new
groups and factional leaders. Following
the Shillong accord, the pro-independence
groups split in which one faction openly
rejected the accord. This led to the forma-
tion of the National Socialist Council of
Nagaland. It also split into Khaplang-led
group and Isak-Muivah-led group due to
the infighting between the top leaders.
Soon, the two camps started using vio-
lence to liquidate the rival camp. They
have also been engaged in a war of words,
especially through the local media. Today
the Isak-Muivah-led group has managed
to establish itself as the more acceptable
force, but others too have their share of
influence. In short, too many factional
leaders remain a problem.
Human rights
Since the government considered the
Naga movement as a secessionist move-
ment and a law and order problem the
use of force under various special laws
have also been considered necessary.
Among them the Armed Forces (Special
Powers) Act, 1958 is the most controver-
sial due to the misuse of the ‘special pow-
ers’ by the members of the security forces.
The citizen groups also want the repeal
of this controversial law. The situation has
been, however, changing as the conflict
parties have chosen to temporarily halt
combat operations against each other. As
a result, human rights abuses by the se-
curity forces have considerably declined.
A newer challenge of factional politics has
remained a concern. The impact of this
unending friction on the lives of the com-
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mon people has been enormous. The com-
mon people have also started question-
ing the conduct of the insurgents, a sce-
nario unknown in the past.
CONFLICT AND INSTITUTION
One of the effects of decades-old
conflict has been the damage it inflicts
on the social, economic, legal and politi-
cal organisation of the society, i.e., its in-
stitutions. The present crisis can be seen
as a result of the inability to enforce a set
of abstract rules leading to the emergence
of new institutional practices. These could
include the government and its agencies,
the armed groups and other citizen
groups. All have come to be associated in
different capacities in the course of the
conflict. The initial reaction to the con-
flict has been to treat it as a case of non-
implementation of rules, that is, as a law
and order problem. This helped the rebels
tap the discontent that emerged from the
alleged human rights abuses by the se-
curity forces. The dissatisfaction on the
ground was compounded by the inabil-
ity of the successive governments to meet
the growing aspirations of its people. In
practice this widespread discontent and
responses to it, have created non-state
institutions of the armed and unarmed
groups.
The armed groups have established
para-statal organisations in many places
that lay down a set of rules and have the
means and resources to enforce them.
Thus, they not only monitor the state in-
stitutions but also administer their own
social welfare services to gain public sup-
port. In this way, many of the functions
which are normally within the domain of
the state institutions have been performed
by non-state institutions. The overall im-
pact has been the dilution of the legiti-
macy of state institutions. Another aspect
of the current conflict has been the prolif-
eration of a large number of pressure
groups including the human rights groups
and the citizen groups. Some of them have
also been at the forefront of promoting
localised peacebuilding efforts and initi-
ating reconciliation processes.
OPTIONS
The government policies and the
counter-insurgency strategies consist of
military, political and socio-economic
measures. The tendency to see this move-
ment as a secessionist and a law and or-
der problem has also legitimized the use
of force. When the use of force achieved a
limited success the other measures were
adopted including the negotiated settle-
ment. In this process several peace accords
have been signed in the past. Unfortu-
nately, these accords have not only failed
but have worsened the situation of con-
flict. Studies show the success of peace
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accords would primarily depend on fac-
tors such as the context of the conflict
and the role of the leaders. The accords
should focus on practical issues. Their
success will also depend on the availabil-
ity of the able leaders. Rushing for accords
without proper groundwork must be
avoided, and the government should re-
frain from signing accords with the wrong
parties. Lastly, one way to satisfy the as-
pirations of ethnic groups while preserv-
ing the territory of the existing states is
to explore the option of non-territorial/
cultural autonomy. This idea is not en-
tirely a new, but has lost significance over
the years.





T he first initiative towardsfinding a negotiated settlement
was arrived at between the Naga National
Council (NNC) and the Governor of As-
sam Akbar Hydari in June 1947. The
agreement was related to the setting up
of an interim politico-administrative ar-
rangement. It did not materialise prima-
rily because, on the one hand, the NNC
interpreted it as their right to complete
independence after the interim period of
ten years, and on the other hand, the Gov-
ernment of India insisted that it only gives
the right to suggest administrative
changes within the country’s constitution.
NNC declares independence
The NNC threw the first challenge
against India with the declaration of in-
dependence on 14 August 1947, a day
before India got independence, and re-
portedly informed the United Nations.
The National Socialist Council of
Nagaland-Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM)
maintained that ‘the Naga people still
uphold the proclamation and will faith-
fully continue to uphold it’.
Sixteen-Point agreement
In 1957, the Naga People’s Conven-
tion (NPC), an organisation of Naga
leaders, floated a proposal for integrat-
ing Tuensang Division with Naga Hills
district. It subsequently became Naga
Hills-Tuensang Area (NHTA) in 1957.
It later proposed the elevation of NHTA
into a state. This proposal became the
Sixteen-Point agreement of 1960 be-
tween the NPC and the Central Govern-
ment. As a temporary arrangement an
interim body (a de-facto legislature) con-
stituting of 42 members was constituted
in 1961.
Assassination of Imkongliba Ao
One of the main architects of the Six-
teen-Point agreement and the Chairman
of the interim body, Imkongliba Ao, was
shot and wounded by unidentified assas-
sins at Mokokchung in August 1961. He
later succumbed to his injuries.
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Formation of the state of Nagaland
The State of Nagaland Act, 1962,
passed by the Parliament, provided for the
formation of the state of Nagaland and
hence NHTA became Nagaland in 1963.
It enjoys special protection under Article
371A of the constitution wherein no Act
of Parliament shall apply to the state
unless the state legislative assembly by a
resolution so decides, in respect of reli-
gious or social practices, customary law
and procedure, and so on.
Assassination attempt on Hokishe
Sema
The then Chief Minister Hokishe Sema
escaped a bid on his life in an attack near
Kohima by heavily-armed assassins on 8
August 1972. Following this incident, the
Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958
was proclaimed in the state, and the affair
of the state was transferred from the Min-
istry of External Affairs to the Ministry of
Home Affairs. The NNC, Federal Govern-
ment of Nagaland and Naga Army were
also declared ‘unlawful organisations’.
Shillong accord
In 1975, the ‘representatives of un-
derground organisations’ (armed groups)
and L P Singh, the then Governor of As-
sam and Nagaland, signed an agreement
popularly known as the Shillong accord,
at Shillong. According to this agreement,
those representing the underground or-
ganisations (said to be close to the NNC)
agreed to accept the constitution and sur-
render arms. It was also agreed that the
representatives of the underground or-
ganisations should get reasonable time to
formulate other issues for discussion for
final settlement. It was rejected by another
group [of NNC cadres] for what they called
‘selling the Naga nation’ by accepting the
Constitution of India.
Formation of NSCN
The split of NNC was confirmed with
the formation of National Socialist Coun-
cil of Nagaland (NSCN) in 1980. The lat-
ter rejected the Shillong accord. It also split
in 1988 due to infighting between the sen-
ior leaders into two groups––NSCN-K led
by S S Khaplang and NSCN-IM led by I
C Swu and Th Muivah. According to me-
dia reports, about 200 supporters of Swu
and Muivah were reportedly killed in a sur-
prise attack by the supporters of Khaplang.
Since then, the two camps have become
bitter rivals indulging in violence and war
of words. Down the line, the NSCN-IM
became one of the most influential armed
groups in the country.
Firing at Mokokchung
Following the killing of two of their
colleagues in an ambush by unidentified
assassins at Mokokchung, on 27 Decem-
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ber 1994, a team of heavily-armed secu-
rity personnel resorted to indiscriminate
firing in which at least 10 civilians were
killed. The soldiers also set ablaze several
houses located at the site of the incident.
Two parallel ceasefires
Two separate ceasefires, firstly be-
tween the Central Government and the
NSCN-IM since 1997, and the second one
between the Central Government and the
NSCN-K since 2001, have been going on
in Nagaland. The outcomes are not
known. When the first ceasefire was modi-
fied in 2001 by inserting a clause, ‘with-
out territorial limits’, there were sponta-
neous protests in neigbouring Manipur.
As a result the controversial clause was
dropped. The NSCN-IM has been insist-
ing on the integration of all Naga-popu-
lated areas under one administrative unit.
Assembly seeks integration
Endorsing the demand for integration,
the Nagaland Legislative Assembly has
adopted resolutions (in 1964, 1970, 1994
and 2003 respectively) urging the Cen-
tral Government to take actions to inte-
grate all the ‘Naga areas’ adjoining the
state of Nagaland.
Integration rally in Kohima
A public rally, popularly known as the
integration rally, attended by several thou-
sand people was held in Kohima, on 31
August 2005, to reiterate the demand for
integration. It was also attended by four
legislators of the Manipur Legislative As-
sembly and a Member of Parliament of
Lok Sabha (the lower house of the Indian
Parliament) from neighbouring Manipur.
Bomb blast in Dimapur
26 people, including women and chil-
dren, were killed and several others
wounded in two powerful bomb blasts
triggered by unidentified assassins inside
a railway station and a nearby market at
Dimapur, the main commercial centre of
the state. Both the incidents occurred on
2 October 2004, the day India celebrates
Mahatma Gandhi’s birthday.
Attack on S C Jamir
Unidentified gunmen ambushed the
motorcade of the then Governor of Goa
and the former Chief Minister of Nagaland
S C Jamir near Mokokchung on 24 No-
vember 2007. Jamir escaped unhurt. This
happened to be the fourth assassination
attempt on his life.
Factional fighting claims 14
As many as 14 insurgents were killed
in a clash between two NSCN factions
near Dimapur on 4 June 2008. Accord-
ing to media reports, all the victims were
NSCN-K cadres. The incident took place
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despite repeated attempts at reconcilia-
tion between the warring groups.
Th Muivah cancels proposed visit to
Manipur
In May 2010, Th Muivah, the general
secretary of NSCN-IM, dropped the pro-
posed visit to his birth place in Manipur’s
Ukhrul district after the Manipur Gov-
ernment refused permission fearing dis-
ruption of law and order. His supporters
hold protest rally at Mao, the Manipur’s
border town, in which two protesters were
killed in police firing.
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TERRAIN
N agaland is bounded by Assamin the west, Myanmar in the
east, Manipur in the south, and Arunachal
Pradesh and Assam in the north. It has
an area of 16,579 sq km which is about
0.5 per cent of the country’s total geo-
graphical area. It is predominantly rural,
in which about 80 per cent of the popu-
lation live in villages, situated on hilltops
and slopes. If all the Naga-inhabited ar-
eas of Northeast India are integrated un-
der one administrative unit it will be
much bigger than the current state of
Nagaland.
Nagaland has a population of 1.98
million (2011), having a density of popu-
lation of 119 persons per sq km. Nagaland
alone is inhabited by a large number of
tribes such as Ao, Angami, Chang,
Konyak, Lotha, Sumi, Chakhesang,
Khiamniungam, Kachari, Phom, Rengma,
Sangtam, Yimchungrü, Kuki, Zeliang and
Pochury. There are several other Naga
tribes outside the state of Nagaland. Each
tribe has different customs, language and
attire. Further Nagaland is also inhabited
by a large number of non-tribal people.
The state has eleven districts.1 Each
district generally has predominant concen-
tration of one of those tribes, making the
districts distinct in their sociopolitical, tra-
ditional, cultural and linguistic character-
istics (Government of Nagaland 2004: 14).
English is the state language while
Nagamese is the common lingua franca.
1 Dimapur, Kohima, Phek, Mokokchung, Mon, Tuensang, Wokha, Zunheboto, Peren, Longleng and Kiphiri.
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Nagaland (also other Naga–inhabited
areas) is hilly and landlocked, character-
ized by low level of development. The
western part of the state is comparatively
developed than the eastern side. It has a
wide variety of forest types, and has land
elevation ranging from a few hundred me-
tres up to about four thousand metres.
The state consists of a narrow strip of hilly
area running northeast to southwest
which is located in the northern exten-
sion of the Arakan Yoma ranges of
Myanmar. The forest cover of the state in
2005 was about 13,719 sq km which was
82.75 per cent of its total geographical
area. Surface transport is the main method
of communication.
The key land use pattern continues
to be shifting cultivation, also known as
Jhum. It covers over 70 per cent of the
total arable area of the state. The state’s
literacy rate has increased to 80.11 per
cent (2011), from 66.59 per cent in
2001.
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HISTORY
T he British arrived in the hillsof today’s Nagaland around
1832, and gradually consolidated control
over the areas. In 1866, they set up a dis-
trict with Samaguting (today’s
Chümukedima) as the headquarters. In
1878, the headquarters was shifted to
Kohima so as to effectively control the
hills. Between 1880 and 1922, the Brit-
ish further consolidated their positions.
The nearby hills which were untouched
by them became ‘unadministered areas’
or today’s Mon and Tuensang districts.
In 1918, the Naga Club was set up at
Kohima by a group of individuals with the
aim of bringing the Nagas together into a
political platform. In fact, it was an organi-
zation of village chiefs, officials and
Dobhasis (interpreters). It submitted a
memorandum to the Simon Commission2
in 1929 to exclude them from the scope of
the any constitutional reform and keep
them under direct administration of the
British Government. The commission how-
ever recommended making Naga Hills into
a district (it became a district in 1936).
In 1945, the Naga Hills District Tribal
Council was set up as a common forum
of the Nagas by the then Deputy Com-
missioner C R Pawsey, rechristened as
Naga National Council in 1946. The
stated objectives included (a) to stand for
the solidarity of the Nagas including
those living in ‘unadministered areas’; (b)
to stand for a complete political au-
tonomy; (c) to stand for the unification of
all Nagas living in free India as well as in
Burma; and (d) to have a separate Naga
judiciary system (Ao 2002: 43). Accord-
ing to Verrier Elwin (1961: 51) its origi-
nal political objective was to achieve lo-
cal autonomy for the hills within Assam
and to train the people for self-govern-
ment.
In June 1946, the NNC submitted a
memorandum to a visiting British Cabi-
net Mission in Delhi who came to India
to study the grounds for granting inde-
pendence for India. The points were: (a)
the NNC stands for solidarity of the Naga
people (including those in the unadmin-
istered areas); (b) NNC strongly protests
2  The British Government appointed a commission under Sir John Simon in 1927 to investigate India’s constitutional
problems and make recommendations to the government on the future constitution of India
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against the grouping of Assam with Ben-
gal; (c) the Naga Hills should be included
in Assam, in a free India, with local au-
tonomy and due safeguards for the inter-
ests of the Nagas, and (d) the Naga tribes
should have a separate electorate (Vashum
2005: 68-69). Another memorandum sub-
mitted to Lord Louis Mountbatten, the
last Viceroy of India, in February 1947
sought, among others, the setting up of
an interim government having full power
in respect of legislation, executive and
judiciary. It also sought to set up a force
for defence and for aiding civil power in
case of emergency. It was however advised
to raise the matter to a committee under
the Constituent Assembly.3 Around this
time, the Nine-Point agreement (also
known as Hydari agreement) was signed
in June 1947, recognizing the rights of
the Nagas to develop themselves accord-
ing to their freely expressed wishes. As
the said agreement could not be imple-
mented, the NNC went ahead to declare
independence. Some observers claimed
that the movement for independence had
once enjoyed the support of the British
and the American Baptist missionaries.
They alleged that when the proposed
Coupland Plan for carving out a separate
entity known as the Crown Colony con-
sisting of the hills of Burma and India
failed, the Naga Club was sponsored by
the powerful British ICS functionaries.4
In 1951, the NNC claimed to have
conducted a ‘free and fair plebiscite’ in
which about 99.9 per cent Nagas report-
edly voted for a ‘Free Sovereign Naga
Nation’. The result of the referendum was
also reportedly communicated to the
United Nations, the British Government
and the Government of India. None of
them recognised the validity of the said
referendum, but most observers ques-
tioned the claim of 99.99 per cent voting
in favour of independence because the
people of Tuensang Division did not vote
at that time. The government also cat-
egorically maintained that it being the
legal heir of the British should have po-
litical authority over the Naga area too,
and hence offered autonomy under the
Sixth Schedule of the constitution.5 The
Naga leaders rejected this offer outrightly.
This was followed by the boycott of the
first parliamentary elections of 1951.
When there was gradual deterioration
of law and order situation in the district
3 The elected body that wrote the Constitution of India.
4 As told to this author by some observers who wish not to be identified.
5 The Sixth Schedule provides for autonomous district and autonomous regions within those districts with elected councils
which enjoy powers to levy taxes, to constitute courts for the administration of justice involving tribals and law-making
powers on subjects including land allotment, occupation or use of land, regulation of ‘jhum’ or other forms of shifting
cultivation, establishment and administration of village and town committees, appointment or succession of chiefs,
inheritance of property, marriage and social customs.
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the government started deployment of
armed forces, and the NNC was first
banned in 1952. In 1954, the NNC re-
portedly set up a parallel government
known as the Republican Government of
Free Nagaland (it was substituted by Fed-
eral Government of Nagaland in 1956).
In 1953, the Assam Maintenance of Pub-
lic Order (Autonomous Districts) Act,
1953 was promulgated in the district fol-
lowed by the declaration of the ‘disturbed
area’ by promulgating the Assam Dis-
turbed Areas Act, 1955 in 1956. This was
followed by the promulgation of the
Armed Forces (Special Powers) Regula-
tion, 1958 (it was converted into an Act).
The situation of the district was reported
in the Report of the States Reorganisa-
tion Commission (1955: 193):
“The Naga Hills district presents an-
other special problem. Owing to the ac-
tivities of the extremist elements, the law
and order situation in this area has been
unstable in recent years. The Nagas boy-
cotted the elections to the autonomous
bodies, with the result that the area had
to be administered directly by the Assam
Government. It has been represented to
us that the law and order problem in the
Naga Hills district is the same as in the
Tuensang area of the NEFA, and that
unless the entire area is brought under
the authority the situation cannot be ef-
fectively dealt with. However, it has been
stated on behalf of the Assam Govern-
ment that the Naga Hills district has been
relatively quiet during the last two or
three years and that there are indications
of the people of the area abjuring violence
in favour of peaceful methods. After tak-
ing the relevant factors into account we
have come to the conclusion that it would
not be desirable to suggest any change in
regard to the Naga Hills district at the
present juncture.”
On the other hand, the moderates,
who favoured a negotiated settlement, set
up the Naga People’s Convention in 1957
and proposed the formation of an admin-
istrative unit by merging Tuensang Divi-
sion with Naga Hills. Thus Naga Hills-
Tuensang Area was created in December
1957. In 1959, the NPC adopted a pro-
posal for the constitution of a separate
state. The proposal was accepted by the
government and hence became the Six-
teen-Point agreement. It upheld that no
Act or law passed by the Parliament re-
lating to (a) religious and social practices
of the Nagas; (b) Naga customary laws
and procedures; (c) civil and criminal jus-
tice concerning decisions according to the
Naga customary law; and (d) ownership
and transfer of land and its resources shall
have legal force in Nagaland unless spe-
cifically applied to it by a majority vote
in the Nagaland legislative assembly. A
de-facto legislature of 42 members was
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constituted in 1961 as a transitional ar-
rangement. In 1963, Naga Hills-Tuensang
Area was elevated to a state known as
Nagaland. It was opposed by NNC.
In 1964, supported by the religious
leaders a committee, known as Peace Mis-
sion, comprising of Jayaprakash Narayan,
B P Chaliha and Rev Michael Scott was
constituted to facilitate direct contact be-
tween the government and the armed
groups. It succeeded in brokering a cease-
fire which was followed by several rounds
of talks. Suddenly, both sides started
blaming each other, leading to the resig-
nation of Jayaprakash Narayan and B P
Chaliha from the committee. Michael
Scott was also subsequently expelled
from the country as the government was
doubtful of his real motives. Their effort,
however, paved the way for a series of
meetings between the Naga leaders and
Indira Gandhi, the then Prime Minister.
In August 1972, unidentified assassins
carried out an unsuccessful assassination
attempt on Chief Minister Hokishe Sema
near Kohima. Following this incident the
government did not renew the ceasefire,
and declared the Federal Government of
Nagaland and the Naga National Coun-
cil as ‘illegal organisations’. It also coin-
cided with the promulgation of the Armed
Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958, includ-
ing the transferring of the affair of
Nagaland which was previously with the
Ministry of External Affairs to the Minis-
try of Home Affairs.
In 1974, the religious leaders set up
Nagaland Peace Council to carry forward
the peacebuilding effort. The timing of its
establishment was coincided with the fall
of two ministries in the state, first the
United Democratic Front ministry, and
second, the Naga Nationalist Organisation
ministry leading to the imposition of the
President’s rule. It was soon followed by a
highly unpopular agreement, popularly
known as the Shillong accord, with ‘ex-
pected confusion’ (Chaube 1999: 252).
Apart from creating confusion among the
people, the accord created a rift between
the NNC leaders. It finally split in 1980
leading to the formation of the NSCN. Less
than a decade later, another split took place
leading to the formation of the NSCN-K
and the NSCN-IM. Since then the two be-
came bitter rivals.
Many years later, another ceasefire be-
tween the Central Government and the
NSCN-IM came into existence in 1997,
and also separately with the NSCN-K
since 2001. The talks have been going on
separately without any apparent break-
through. The NSCN-IM has been push-
ing for the integration of the Naga areas
under one administrative unit and also
wanted to extend the jurisdiction of the
ceasefire beyond Nagaland. In 2003, the
Nagaland Legislative Assembly endorsed
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this demand by passing a resolution.
However, the last decade (2000-2010)
was marred by a series of factional clashes
between the rival groups; in which 2004
alone saw at least 17 incidents, 14 in
2005 and about 90 in 2006.6
In an attempt to boost the morale of
his followers, Th Muivah proposed to visit
Manipur in 2010. However, the proposed
visit had to be deferred after Manipur Gov-
ernment banned his entry into the state.
Lastly, at a time when several groups
have been seeking the integration of
Naga-populated areas, there is also a new
demand for the division of Nagaland to
facilitate the creation of another state. In
January 2011, public rallies were held at
various places of the state demanding the
formation of a new state comprising the
districts of Tuensang, Mon, Kiphire and
Longleng.




CLAIM FOR AN INDEPENDENT HOMELAND
N ortheast India came intoincreasing contact with the
pan-Indian imperial formation following
the advent of the British in the early 19th
century. This event brought immense
transformation in the society, economy
and polity of this region. Since then this
area became a great destination of migra-
tion. In addition, the political boundary
of the area had to be adjusted. From 1826
to 1873, the British ruled Assam, then
constituted major part of today’s North-
east, as a part of Bengal. In 1874, Assam
was made a province by incorporating the
Bengali-populated areas of Cachar, Sylhet
and Goalpara. In 1905 Bengal was reor-
ganised to form, along with Assam, the
provinces of (a) East Bengal and Assam,
and (b) Bengal (it included the western
part of Bengal, Bihar, Orissa and Chota
Nagpur). In 1912, the partition of Ben-
gal was annulled.
Along with the consolidation of the
colonial rule in the plains, the surround-
ing hills too were also gradually incorpo-
rated. Then a number of colonial laws were
introduced to govern the hills. For in-
stance, the hill areas were declared ‘back-
ward’ areas under the Government of In-
dia Act, 1919, and then as ‘excluded’ and
‘partially excluded’ areas under the Gov-
ernment of India Act, 1935 placing them
outside the purview of the provincial ad-
ministration and bringing them directly
under the Governor of Assam. The Naga
Hills was also initially made a ‘backward
area’, then an ‘excluded area’ and became
a district. After independence, the Naga
Hills along with Tuensang Division be-
came, firstly as Naga Hills-Tuensang Area
in 1957 and finally, the state of Nagaland
in 1963.
The Nagas have been maintaining
that they are a distinct population and
constitute a separate and sovereign na-
tion occupying about an area of 120,000
sq km. They also alleged that the land
inhabited by them is now divided, with-
out their consent, between India and
Myanmar. One part, they claimed, has
been brought under India (Assam,
Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur and
Nagaland), and the rest under Burma/
Myanmar (Kachin state and Sagaing Di-
vision). It has been further claimed that
the Naga people traditionally lived in vil-
lage-states, independent and self-con-
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tained, with a democratically constituted
village council headed by the ‘Chief’. Fur-
ther, it has been claimed that the ‘Naga
nation’ had remained unconquered and
unadministered by any alien power and
hence existed independently since time
immemorial. Only a small part in the
southwest entered the recorded history of
British imperialism in 1863 when some
villages were invaded and occupied by the
British forces.7 This country was said to
have consisted of several regions with dif-
ferent languages which cannot be under-
stood by each other. Until the British
brought them together there was no unity
among them.8 According to them, their
territory is sandwiched between the Indo-
Myanmar frontier and very little is known
of them by the rest of the world, even to
the majority of the Indian population
(Shimray 2007: 1). As N Venuh, an advo-
cate of independent Nagaland puts it, “We
are not part of India, so we cannot be
called secessionists. The government has
to give us our rights. We can be friends
with the Indian state, but cannot be part
of the Indian Union ... We never wanted
to be a part of India.”9 Further, a senior
NSCN-IM leader Punthing Shimray re-
called “When I go to India, they tell me,
you are a part of India, you should be
happy that you have everything. But I
want to be free; I want my right to choose.
India’s claim to Nagaland is a legal one,
because Nagaland was handed over to
them by the British. But nations aren’t
just born, they are created by people com-
ing together. It is not about having a le-
gal right, it is about the aspirations of the
people and their right to choose. We never
chose India ...”10 Whether or not all Nagas
share this view of history and territorial-
ity is a matter of investigation. Yet there
is little doubt that they have developed a
strong sense of themselves as a collectivity
(Baruah 2003: 322).
The Naga Club took the first ever ini-
tiative to bring the Naga people together
under one administration. For the first
time it sought the attention of the Simon
Commission to exclude them from the
scope of any future constitutional reform
and to be kept under direct administra-
tion of the British. The memorandum the
Naga Club submitted to the Simon Com-
mission in 1929 stated “…we beg to sub-
mit below our view with prayer that our
hills may be withdrawn from the Re-
7 ‘The Great Naga Family’, available at <http://www.angelfire.com/nm/nagalim/people_origin.html> (accessed on 31
December 2011).
8 Some observers alleged that the demand for independence had a British and American Baptist Missionaries’ backing from
the 1920’s.
9 Dutta, Suneha. 2010. “We are not part of India, so we can’t be called secessionists”, Tehelka Magazine, 7(44), 6 November.
10 “India listened to us only when we took up arms”, Tehelka Magazine, 7(44), 6 November 2010.
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formed Scheme and placed outside the
Reforms but directly under British Gov-
ernment. We never asked for any reforms
and we do not wish for any reforms. Be-
fore the British Government conquered
our country in 1879-80, we were living
in a state of intermitted warfare with the
Assamese of the Assam valley to the north
and west of our country and Manipuris
to the south. They never conquered us nor
were we subjected to their rules. On the
other hand, we were always a terror to
these people. Our country within the ad-
ministered area consists of more than
eight regions quite different from one an-
other, with quite different languages
which cannot be understood by each
other, and there are more regions outside
the administered area which are not
known at present. We have no unity
among us and it is only the British Gov-
ernment that is holding us together now
… Our language is quite different from
those of the plains and we have no social
affinities with the Hindus or Mussalmans.
We are look down upon by the one for
beef and the other for our pork and by
both for our want in education, is not due
to any fault of ours. Our country is poor
and it does not pay for any administra-
tion. Therefore if it is continued to be
placed under Reformed Scheme, we are
afraid new and heavy taxes will have to
be imposed on us, and when we cannot
pay, then all lands have to be sold and in
long run we shall have no share in the
land of our birth and life will not be worth
living then. Though our land at present
is within the British territory, government
have always recognized our private rights
in it, but if we are forced to enter the coun-
cil the majority of whose number is sure
to belong to other districts, we also have
much fear the introduction of foreign laws
and customs to supersede our own cus-
tomary laws which we now enjoy. For the
above reasons, we pray that the British
Government will continue to safeguard
our rights against all encroachment from
other people who are more advanced than
us by withdrawing our country that we
should not be thrust to the mercy of other
people who could never be subjected; but
to leave us alone to determine ourselves
as in ancient times” (see Vashum 2005:
175-176).
The unfulfilled task was carried for-
ward by NNC which ultimately led to the
signing of the Nine-Point agreement in
June 1947. The agreement recognised the
right of the Nagas to develop themselves
according to their freely expressed wishes
on various subjects, including the issues
relating to judiciary, executive and legis-
lative powers. The ninth clause of the said
agreement stated “the Governor of Assam
as the agent of the Government of Indian
Union will have a special responsibility
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for a period of ten years to ensure that
due observance of this agreement; at the
end of this period the Naga National
Council will be asked whether they re-
quire the above agreement to be extended
for a further period, or a new agreement
regarding the future of the Naga people
arrived at.” Both sides however failed to
reach an agreement on the exact mean-
ing of the ninth clause. Thereafter, in 1949,
the government revoked the agreement
unilaterally, stating that it no longer con-
sidered the agreement valid.11
As a result, like other hill areas the
limited autonomy under the Sixth
Schedule of the constitution was sug-
gested. They were not impressed with the
limited autonomy and rejected it out-
rightly. This marked the beginning of the
first real armed challenge against the
Indian state. However, through the ef-
fort of the moderate leaders who enjoyed
the backing of the government, an ad-
ministrative unit known as Naga Hills-
Tuensang Area was constituted. It later
became the state of Nagaland. Regard-
ing the creation of Nagaland, sociologist
Lanunungsang Ao (2002: 81) stated “In
order to suppress the uprising Naga
movement for freedom and to divide
them, it was strategically planned to in-
stall an Indian state at all cost at least
in certain part of Naga territory. For this,
it was necessary to use the people of
Nagaland to be trapped themselves,
making a political instrument.”
In 2000, the Nagaland Pradesh Con-
gress Committee (I) published a booklet
titled ‘Bedrock of Naga Society’ question-
ing the existence of a Naga nation. The
controversial booklet stated: “The funda-
mental assumption underlying the notion
that statehood compromised the sover-
eignty of Nagas, is that the Nagas were a
separate independent entity from time
immemorial till the British rulers con-
quered them. Therefore, when the British
left India in 1947, the Nagas should have
reverted to their independent status.
Prima facie, this sounds an attractive
proposition, but is it really true? Let us
not be misled by words like ‘time imme-
morial’. Did we have an independent po-
litical existence at all immediately before
the British rule or even during the Brit-
ish days? Were we really an independent
nation? A political entity or a nation has
to be based on historical facts … Other
areas in the Northeast like Assam,
Manipur, Tripura and the Kacharis had
their territories and their kingdoms. Did
we? The stark and inescapable truth is
that neither did we have a definite and
unified political structure and nor did we




exist as a nation. We were actually a group
of heterogeneous, primitive and diverse
tribes living in far-flung villages that had
very little in common and negligible con-
tact with each other … We continue to
claim we were an independent nation till
the British conquered us. Did we have a
boundary for our nation? … Did we have
a ruler or a Government? The writ of a
village chief did not extend beyond his
village. Did we have a capital city where
the Government sat? … Did we have a
currency or a coinage like other kingdoms
or nations? We lived on barter till the
British introduced the rupee. Did we have
armed forces to defend our nation? Did
we have common laws, rules and regula-
tions for our nation as a whole? Did we
have an administrative apparatus to look
after the welfare of the people? Did we
have roads that linked the nation? The
answer to all these are obviously in the
negative ...”12 This booklet was condemned
by a large number of people.
Further, the Government of India in-
sisted that Naga territory is an integral
part of the country, and hence the ques-
tion of independence does not arise. This
claim is based on the British Parliament’s
Indian Independence Act, 1947 which
stated “… subject to the provisions of sub-
sections (3) and (4) of this section, the
territories of India shall be the territories
under the sovereignty of His Majesty
which, immediately before the appointed
day, were included in British India ex-
cept the territories which, under subsec-
tion (2) of this section, are to be the terri-
tories of Pakistan.” Thus, on the basis of
its right as ‘inheritor’ of British colonial
power, the government refused to recog-
nise the claim (Chasie and Hazarika
2009: 5). Therefore, anything outside the
scope of the constitution is not possible
to the government. The government is
willing to grant limited autonomy within
the Indian laws. This position has been
indicated way back in July 1946, when
Jawaharlal Nehru wrote to T Shakrie, the
then secretary of the Naga National Coun-
cil. The letter stated “it is obvious that
the Naga territory in eastern Assam is
much too small to stand by itself politi-
cally or economically. It lies between two
huge countries, India and China, and part
of it consists of rather backward people
who require considerable help. When In-
dia is independent, as it is bound to be
soon, it will not be possible for the Brit-
ish Government to hold on the Naga ter-
ritory or any part of it. They would be iso-
lated there between India and China. In-
evitable, therefore, this Naga territory
must form part of India and of Assam
12 Nagaland Pradesh Congress Committee (I). 2002. Bedrock of Naga Society, Kohima: NPCC (I).
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with which it has developed such close
associations” (quoted in Vashum 2005:
69).
INTEGRATION OF NAGA AREAS
Closely linked to the claim of inde-
pendence is the issue of integration of
Naga areas of the Northeast region of the
country under one administrative unit.
Then, who are the Nagas? The Nagas are
a group of heterogeneous tribes (Chasie
and Hazarika 2009: 1) each having a dis-
tinct identity. Since their early history is
sketchy and the origin of the word ‘Naga’
is also obscure (Verghese 1996: 83). It is,
however, believed to have originated from
the Burmese word ‘Naka’, meaning peo-
ple with earrings (Government of
Nagaland 2004: 20). However, according
to Verrien Elwin (1961: 4) “the name was
not in general use among the Nagas until
recently. It was given to them by the peo-
ple of the plains and in the last century
was used indiscriminately for the Abors
and Dafflas as well as for the Nagas them-
selves. Even in late as 1954, I found the
people of Tuensang rarely speaking of
themselves as Nagas but as Konyaks,
Changs, Phoms, and so on. Gradually,
however, as the Nagas became more
united, they began to use the name for
themselves, until today it has become
widely popular.” Thus there is no consen-
sus on the precise number of Naga tribes.
The 2001 Census listed 17 tribes in
Nagaland including a tribe name ‘Naga’.
In addition, the census listed a category
name ‘unclassified Naga’. The Naga Hoho
and the Naga Peoples Movement for Hu-
man Rights (NPMHR) listed altogether
42 tribes in Nagaland and beyond
(Kikon 2005: 2833), in which U A
Shimray (2004: 4637-4643) listed 17 in
Nagaland, 16 in Manipur, three in
Arunachal Pradesh and some Zeliangrong
Nagas in Assam. Shimray’s list included
four others, namely Konyak, Somra-
Tangkhul, Phom and Yimchunger in
Myanmar. Nonetheless, the single most
important development that made the
imagining of the Nagas as a collectivity
possible was their conversion to Christi-
anity (Eaton 1997: 245). The missionar-
ies printed the Bible in local dialects and
in the process gave those dialects a writ-
ten form using the Roman script. The
Government of Nagaland (2004: 62) puts
it, “The first significant exposure, and
movement, of the Nagas to the outside
world was during the First World War.
About 5000 Nagas went to France to work
as commissioned labour and returned
with money, which they invested in hous-
ing, construction and infrastructure de-
velopment. This marked the beginning of
monetary circulation in the Naga society.
World War II was the second major expo-
sure to the outside world for the Nagas.
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The end of the war marked the beginning
of the participation of Naga people in dif-
ferent sectors, including trade and busi-
ness. The postwar reconstruction work
provided new avenues of employment to
the people of Nagaland. Increasing mo-
bility of outside people, mostly soldiers,
in and out of Naga areas, increased their
familiarity with Naga items. New oppor-
tunities for trade were available. Later, the
creation of the Naga Hills-Tuensang Area
as a separate unit in 1957, and statehood
in 1963, further boosted opportunities for
income and livelihood.” Nonetheless, ac-
cording to sociologist A C Sinha (2011:
77-98) “Christianity provided a novel
world view with its new pantheon, divin-
ity, taboos, ideals, morals, sacred beings,
scripture, and a modern/urban/western
outlook to judge themselves and others.
It as well provided the new converts with
a confidence to deal with the world, neigh-
bours, plains folk and outsiders with a
sense of confidence, if not superiority, and
equality.”
The integration of Naga areas under
one administrative unit has been one of
the key demands since the colonial pe-
riod. The NSCN-IM proposes to call its
self-proclaimed homeland as Nagalim, in-
stead of Nagaland, as the latter implies
the state of Nagaland alone. According to
it, Nagalim is a nation occupying an area
of 120,000 sq km, currently divided be-
tween India and Myanmar. It maintains
that the present-state of Nagaland is an
‘Indian-imposed entity’ which falls far
short of their aspirations. Its creation
opened a new political corridor for the
absorption to the Indian constitution and
the roadmap of accession (Shimray 2007:
95). The proposed Nagalim comprises the
present state of Nagaland and other
Naga-populated areas of Arunachal
Pradesh, Assam and Manipur (also those
of Myanmar) which it claims as their
‘rightful homeland’. Thus the proposed
homeland will be about seven times big-
ger than today’s Nagaland. According to
a commentator “There are Nagas in
Manipur, Arunachal and Assam. We want
to include them because the Nagas were
artificially divided. We are not going to
grab anyone’s land. We just want to bring
the people under one administration.
When India was under British rule, it was
divided into different parts without the
will of people. They didn’t like that. Simi-
larly, we want to maintain good relations
with our neighbors but also want to make
sure the Nagas are brought together.”13
According to U A Shimray (2007: 16-
17) “The Naga areas are mountainous in
character … during the colonial period
13 Dutta, Suneha. 2010. “We are not part of India, so we can’t be called secessionists”, Tehelka Magazine, 7(44), 6 November.
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and in post-colonial India, the contigu-
ous Naga areas were segmented into dif-
ferent political boundaries. Today, the
Naga Hills fall into the administration of
Nagaland, Manipur, Assam and Arunachal
Pradesh. The Naga population is distrib-
uted in Tirap and Changlang districts of
Arunachal Pradesh state, Nagaland state,
hill districts of Manipur state constitut-
ing Tamenglong, Senapati, Chandel and
Ukhrul and part of Karbi Anglong, Mikir
hills, Lakhimpur, Sibsagar, Nowgong, and
North Cachar Hills district of Assam.”
Shimray further stated that territorial
politics based on ethnic aspirations
gained momentum following the cease-
fire between the government and the
NSCN-IM.
Endorsing this demand, the Nagaland
Legislative Assembly adopted a resolu-
tion in 1964 urging the Central Govern-
ment for the integration of Naga areas
adjoining Nagaland. Reiterating the ear-
lier resolution, it had adopted another
resolution in 1970 which says  “ …
whereas the demand for integration of
contiguous areas inhabited by Nagas has
not so far been met by the Government
of India despite this assembly having
passed resolution to that effect in Decem-
ber 1964, and despite the inclusion of this
demand in 16-Point agreement signed by
the Naga People’s Convention and the
Government of India in 1960; whereas
this failure to fulfill integration demand
has led to serious discontentment among
the sections of the Nagas both inside and
outside Nagaland. This assembly resolves
that the Government of India be urged to
integrate the contiguous areas inhabited
by Nagas without further delay.”14
Three states, namely Manipur, Assam
and Arunachal Pradesh, are against the
creation of Nagalim if any parts of their
territory are to be taken away. These states
have shown due apprehension of the ex-
isting ceasefire as NSCN-IM wanted the
extension of its jurisdiction to these
states. These states felt that the exten-
sion of ceasefire to their respective states
could facilitate the creation of Nagalim
which means loosing parts of their respec-
tive territories. The effect of the ceasefire,
however, has been more threatening to
Manipur because of two reasons. First, the
Nagas wanted the inclusion of four hill
districts of that state to the proposed
homeland. If this happens Manipur’s to-
tal area will be drastically reduced. Sec-
ondly, a large number of NSCN-IM cad-
res, including its powerful general secre-
tary Th Muivah, are the natives of that
state. Thus the non-Nagas are worried
that the extension of the ceasefire could




pave the way for the disintegration of the
territorial boundary of the state. When the
terms of the current ceasefire was
amended to include ‘without territorial
limits’ in June 2001 spontaneous agita-
tion broke out in the streets of Manipur,
especially in Imphal. The situation wors-
ened on 18 June when thousands of peo-
ple marched on the streets of Imphal and
ransacked the residences of political lead-
ers, offices of political parties and set
ablaze the main building housing the
Manipur Legislative Assembly. Several
protestors were killed in Imphal when the
security guards manning the official resi-
dence of the state’s chief minister opened
fire to control the irate mob forcing the
government to drop the controversial
clause. But the ‘18 June 2001 Meitei up-
rising’ also left a deep scar in the ethnic
relationship between the Nagas and the
Meiteis (Shimray 2007: 15).
The United Committee Manipur, a
pressure group active in the valley areas
of Manipur, (2003: 9) which spearheaded
the anti-ceasefire extension agitation
stated “The Great June Uprising (agita-
tion) was basically to counter the policy
of Naga expansionism both in ideology
and territory originally propagated by the
protagonist of an independent Nagaland.
In the process, the Naga underground had
expanded their ideology from tribalism
to nationalism. Likewise their territories
have expanded from village to statehood
within India. The Naga underground is
still pursuing to attain nationhood with
an expanded independent sovereign ter-
ritory. This Naga expansionism had hurt
the feelings of Manipuris to the root be-
cause the policy of Naga territorial expan-
sionism not only directly threatens the
territorial integrity of Manipur state but
also affects the age-old ethnic unity of
Manipur.” In Assam too, the Asom
Jatiyatabadi Yuva Chatra Parishad, an
influential students’ group, issued a
strongly-worded statement against giving
an inch of their land to the proposed
homeland, and if so, it claimed, ‘a thou-
sand Muivahs will be born in Assam’.
The Manipur Legislative Assembly
had also repeatedly resolved against any
division of the state. Its resolution
adopted in 1995 urged all the ethnic
groups of the state to stop the demands
of separate homeland. The house also re-
solved to face ‘all the activities which may
endanger the territorial boundaries of the
pre-independence days of Manipur’. An-
other resolution adopted in 2002 stated
“Whereas, the present territorial bounda-
ries of the erstwhile princely state of
Manipur is continued to be maintained
without being challenged from any au-
thority even after the merger of the state
of Manipur with the Union of India un-
der the Merger Agreement dated 21st Sep-
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tember 1949 and even after the state of
Manipur became a Part C state under the
Union of India with effect from 23rd Janu-
ary 1950. Such territorial boundaries of
the state of Manipur are continued to be
protected under the provisions of the Ter-
ritorial Council Act, 1956, Union Territo-
ries Act 1963 and under the provisions
of North Eastern Areas (Reorganisation)
Act, 1971, under which Manipur attains
statehood in 1972 … This house in its
sitting specially held on this twelfth day
of June 2002 while unanimously reiter-
ating the earlier resolutions to maintain
the territorial integrity of the state of
Manipur resolved to urge upon the Gov-
ernment of India to make suitable amend-
ments of Article 3 of the Constitution of
India or to insert appropriate provision
in the Constitution of India for protect-
ing the territorial integrity of Manipur and
pending the aforesaid amendments and
incorporation, the Government of India
be urged upon to assure the people of
Manipur on the floor of the Parliament
that the territorial integrity of Manipur
will not be disturbed at any cost” (quoted
in United Committee Manipur 2003: 24-
25).
Despite stiff opposition from other
states, the Nagas are not willing to relent
on the issue of integration, and hence
adopt several pressure tactics. For in-
stance, in 2006, a student group known
as All Naga Students’ Association
Manipur (ANSAM) started a campaign
for the affiliation of the private schools
located in Naga-populated areas of
Manipur to the Nagaland Board of Sec-
ondary Education (NBSE). The Nagaland
Legislative Assembly also endorsed this
stand in 2007 by passing a Bill allowing
affiliation of non-Nagaland schools with
the NBSE. On the other side of the di-
vide, the Manipur Government passed an
ordinance in which schools wishing to
affiliate outside the state need to take its
prior permission. Again, when Manipur
Government declared June 18 as ‘State
Integrity Day’ in honour of the 18 per-
sons killed during the anti-ceasefire ex-
tension agitation, the ANSAM imposed a
52-day-long blockade of the Mao-Imphal
section of the national highway no. 39,
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the lifeline of Manipur, in 2005. To help
relieve the hardships of the people of land-
locked Manipur, the Indian Air Force was
pressed into service to airlift medicines
from Guwahati. In the 2012 legislative
elections held in Manipur, the Naga Peo-
ple’s Front (NPF), the ruling party in
Nagaland, entered the electoral politics in
Manipur by fielding 12 candidates in the
Nagas-populated areas. The party man-
aged to secure four seats.
Under such circumstances the NSCN-
IM leadership seems to be worried over
the inordinate delay in finding an accept-
able settlement. However, in the words of
its chairman I C Swu, “Political negotia-
tion with the Government of India has
been continuing for more than 13 years
now, I thank the Naga people for the pa-
tience and valuable inputs from various
individuals and organisations. I assure
the Naga people once again that NSCN
has not compromised and will not com-
promise on the issue that will endanger
our future. We can only find a political
settlement with India on the basis of the
recognition of the unique history of the
Nagas by the Government of India on July
11, 2001 in Amsterdam. Any Indo-Naga
political solution will be on the basis of
the uniqueness of the Naga history … Our
history is very clear to us; our issue is very
clear, and our right is also very clear to
us. We are not confused, we know what is
best for us and we will decide our own
future. No other people can determine our
future.”15
FACTIONALISM
The Naga movement for independence
and integration has also been affected by
factional politics and violence. As some-
one rightly puts it, ‘they have a long his-
tory of killing Nagas with dissenting
voices’.16 If there were pro-independence
groups who sought complete independ-
ence, there were also pro-India groups who
have faith in the constitution of the coun-
try. For the latter the creation of the state
of Nagaland was their ultimate goal.
Nonetheless, the pro-independence
groups could not project themselves as a
united front thus leading to the emergence
of new groups and factional leaders. It is
thus appropriate to say that the move-
ment has been dominated by inter-tribal
rivalry and a struggle for hegemony
(Horam 1990: 142-3). If the idea of Naga
as a collectivity has developed, many
Nagas still remain the individual tribe
first. In this context, B G Verghese (2004:
96) rightly puts, “Localism (love for vil-
15 This is an excerpt from the speech of I C Swu, the Yaruiwo (President) of the ‘Republic of Nagalim’ on the occasion of the
64th ‘Naga Independence day’, on 14 August 2010, at Oking. The statement was circulated by the NSCN-IM to this author.
16 This was told to this author.
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lage) and tribalism (placing the tribe be-
fore the larger collectivity) are among the
chief problems that have dogged Naga
efforts at nation building or the concept
of Naganess or Nagahood.”
In the aftermath of the Shillong ac-
cord, the pro-independence forces split in
which one camp summarily rejected the
said accord for what they called ‘selling
the Naga nation’ by accepting the consti-
tution, while the other camp neither wel-
comed nor denounced the said accord.
This division led to the emergence of
NSCN in 1980. It also split into NSCN-
K and NSCN-IM in 1988 due to infight-
ing between the top leaders. According to
reliable sources, an important hideout,
also known as NSCN Council Headquar-
ters, located at a place known as Hangsen
was attacked on 30 April 1988 by the
supporters of Khaplang with the assist-
ance of some Burmese soldiers killing
about 200 people. It was ‘a great disaster
for the Naga national movement’
(Vashum 2005: 96). As Arkotong
Longkumer (2010: 144) puts it, “due to
internal conflicts, and perhaps due to per-
sonality clashes, the northern Naga and
Burmese Naga contingent split in 1988
to form the NSCN-K, under their leader
S S Khaplang, who is from Burma. The
remnant of the group came to be known
as the NSCN-IM, after their leaders, Isak
Swu and Th Muivah. The latter is the
most powerful group in the region.” Since
then the two factions started violence to
liquidate each other and the fighting in-
tensified from the later part of the 1980s.
They also engaged in war of words.
Meanwhile, the NSCN-IM has man-
aged to establish itself as the more ac-
ceptable group among the people, but
other groups have their share of influence.
The NSCN-K has been trying to collabo-
rate with other groups in the fight against
its arch rival. With the aim of creating
panic among the Tangkhuls living in
Nagaland the NSCN-K had even warned
them to leave the state alleging that the
people of the state have bore the brunt of
their cruelty. Its hostility towards
Tangkhuls, one of the populous commu-
nities among the Naga group of tribe in
Manipur, has been due to the fact that Th
Muivah is a Tangkhul. Thus the
Tangkhuls living in Nagaland became the
natural target of anti-NSCN-IM forces.
Thus, the factional clashes appear to
indicate that the current ceasefires are be-
ing violated at will. Worse, efforts to end
the abiding and violent confrontation
have had no visible impact on the war-
ring camps. According to the ceasefire
agreements, the cadres of each faction are
to remain confined to their respective des-
ignated camps, but the rule is flouted
more often than it is kept. Indeed, the
ceasefire has been exploited by the armed
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groups to consolidate and expand. The
government also tends to surrender to
their caprice. Since the 1990s, the Church
and other citizen groups have been at-
tempting to bring the warring groups to-
gether through a reconciliation process,
but their efforts have proven futile.
HUMAN RIGHTS
Since the Naga movement has been
largely seen as a secessionist and a law
and order problem, and the insurgents as
criminals and misguided youth, have le-
gitimized the use of force under various
special laws such as the Assam Mainte-
nance of Public Order (Autonomous Dis-
tricts) Act, 1953, the Assam Disturbed
Areas Act, 1955 and the Armed Forces
(Special Powers) Regulation, 1958 (it was
converted into an Act). The most contro-
versial one has been the Armed Forces
(Special Powers) Act, 1958 which was
promulgated in the state in 1972. There
have been allegations of the special pow-
ers under the Act being misused by the
members of the security forces. Citizen
groups have been demanding its repeal.
In the words of Chasie and Hazarika
(2009: 60) “AFSPA was the barest, the
most controversial, and also the most
powerful of legislation drawn up by law-
makers in Delhi to crush the first armed
and political challenge to independent
India’s territorial and political integrity.
It also authorized the first use of the army
in India against a major political upris-
ing.” Under this Act “Any commissioned
officer, warrant officer, non-commissioned
officer or any other person of equivalent
rank in the armed forces may, in a dis-
turbed area, (a) if he is of opinion that it
is necessary so to do for the maintenance
of public order, after giving such due
warning as he may consider necessary, fire
upon or otherwise use force, even to the
causing of death, against any person who
is acting in contravention of any law or
order for the time being in force in the
disturbed area prohibiting the assembly
of five or move persons or the carrying of
weapons or of things capable of being
used as weapons or of fire-arms, ammu-
nition or explosive substances.” Giving an
account of the human rights situation in
the past Vashum (2005: 96) stated “In the
past decades, especially, beginning from
about the mid-1950s, India was charged
for having committed many human rights
violations on the Nagas. But all this hap-
pened without being known to the out-
side world, either because it was deliber-
ate on the part of the Indian government
or because of the inaccessibility of the re-
gion and backwardness in many respects,
specifically, in the media world. Except
for few cases of human rights violations
being given some justice under the judi-
cial system of India, many cases were
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unattended to.” Organisations such as the
Naga Peoples Movement for Human
Rights (NPMHR) consistently high-
lighted and exposed the gross violation
of rights perpetrated by the Indian state.
Meanwhile, largely on account of the
current ceasefires the human rights
abuses by the security forces have deci-
sively declined, while the containing fac-
tional politics has remained a challenge
to the human rights front. The impact of
this unending friction on the lives of the
common people has been enormous. The
common people have also started ques-
tioning the conduct of the insurgents, a
scenario unknown in the past. For in-
stance, an organisation known as the
Chakhesang Public Organisation, in
March 2006, made a declaration prohib-
iting extortion, movement of insurgents
in uniform and the setting up of desig-
nated camps close to their villages. Again,
in April 2006, the Phek Area Public Or-
ganisation urged the state government to
raise the issue of factional clashes with
the respective groups and the Central
Government, and to ensure that insur-




O ne of the most destructiveeffects of prolonged conflict has
been the damage it inflict on the social,
economic, legal and political organisation
of the society, i.e., its institutions. Gener-
ally institution means different things to
different people, and the academic litera-
ture is also not very clear on its definition
(Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2004).
Institution, according to Jack Knight
(1992), is a set of rules that structure so-
cial interaction in particular ways. And
for a set of rules to be an institution,
knowledge of these rules must be shared
by the members of the relevant commu-
nity or society. In this series of
backgrounders, an institution is taken to
be a public system of rules which defines
offices and positions with their rights and
duties, powers and immunities, and the
like. These rules specify certain forms of
action as permissible, others as forbidden;
and they provide for certain penalties and
defenses, and so on, when violation oc-
cur. Thus an institution may be thought
of in two ways: first as an abstract object,
that is, as a possible form of conduct ex-
pressed by a system of rules; and second,
as the realisation in the thought and con-
duct of certain persons at a certain time
and place of the actions specified by these
rules (Rawls 1999).
The picture of this conflict has place
for institutions in both the senses that
John Rawls has suggested. The present
crisis can be seen as a result of the inabil-
ity to enforce a set of abstract rules lead-
ing to the emergence of new institutional
practices. These could include the govern-
ment and its agencies, armed groups and
other pressure groups. All have come to
be associated in different capacities in the
course of the conflict. The initial reaction
to this conflict has been to treat it as a
case of non-implementation of rules, that
is, as a law and order problem. This helped
the rebels tap the discontent that emerged
from the alleged human rights abuses by
the government force. The dissatisfaction
on the ground was compounded by the
inability of the successive governments to
meet the growing aspirations of its peo-
ple. In practice this widespread discon-
tent and responses to it, have created non-
state institutions of the armed and un-
armed groups.
Therefore an overview of the institu-
tions that cause conflicts, ease conflicts,
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and institutions that emerge from con-
flicts are important. Apart from NSCN-
IM and NSCN-K, there are others like
NSCN-U and NNC. These groups have
the common goal of securing complete in-
dependence, although, the NSCN-IM has
been concentrating more on integration.
These groups have established para-
statal organisations in the areas they con-
trolled in that they lay down a set of rules
and have the means and resources to en-
force them. Thus, they not only monitored
the state institutions but also adminis-
tered their own social welfare services to
gain public support. In this way, many of
the functions which are ordinarily within
the domain of the state institutions have
been encroached upon by the non-state
institutions. The overall impact has been
the dilution of the legitimacy of state in-
stitutions.
All of them claimed to have estab-
lished their own government such as Fed-
eral Government of Nagaland and Gov-
ernment of the People’s Republic of
Nagaland. They also claimed to have con-
stituted parliamentary institutions, such
as Tatar Hoho, and standing armies such
as Naga Home Guards and Naga Army.
According to sociologist, Lanunungsang
Ao (2002: 91), “Most surprisingly, one will
notice the functioning of several distinct
governments in this tiny backward state.
They are the state government. There are
two parallel federal government of
Nagaland under NNC and two socialist
governments. These four parallel govern-
ments are known as the underground
governments, outlaws, outfit, unlawful
and unrecognized governments by the
overground government.” The Govern-
ment of the People’s Republic of
Nagaland is the government-in-exile of
the NSCN-IM and is headed by Muivah
and Swu, and the Naga Army is its mili-
tary wing. It virtually runs a parallel gov-
ernment in the areas they control. Impor-
tant ministries are defence, home, finance
and foreign affairs. There are also other
ministries looking after education, infor-
mation and publicity, forests and miner-
als, law and justice, religious affairs and
so on. The Home Ministry is said to be
very crucial one in which the heads of ‘ad-
ministrative regions’ report to it. The ad-
ministration reaches down to areas of
their influence. They have also raised their
grievances before various multinational
organisations like United Nations Human
Rights (UNHR), Unrepresented Nations
and Peoples Organisation (UNPO), and
UN Working Group on Indigenous
Populations.
Further, these groups have adopted
highly efficient mechanisms to raise funds
locally to run their programmes. This has
been legitimized on the ground that ‘every
nation collects revenues from its citizen;
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hence Nagaland is no exception’. The
taxes are collected from government offi-
cials, traders, contractors, politicians and
common people. The collection of taxes
along the national highways passing
through the Naga-inhabited areas also
yields a significant, if not preponderant, part
of their revenues. For instance, the Dimapur-
Mao-Imphal section of the national high-
way no. 39 is virtually under the control of
NSCN-IM. With various armed groups as-
serting dominance over the extended seg-
ments of the highways, the people are per-
petually at their mercy. Further, they have
been playing an important role whenever
local elections were conducted to ensure the
victory of their loyalists.
Another aspect of the long-standing
conflict has been the proliferation of a
large number of pressure groups such as
human rights groups and citizen groups.
The former focus primarily on human
rights issues and advocacy, and are in-
creasingly becoming more vocal against
the alleged human rights abuses. The
other set of institutions focused prima-
rily on preserving, protecting and uphold-
ing the overall interests of the people.
Many of them are of recent origin, and
the direct consequences of the long-stand-
ing conflict. Some of them have also been
at the forefront of promoting localised
peacebuilding efforts and initiating rec-
onciliation processes.
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OPTIONS
P rofessor Lanunungsang Ao ofNagaland University (2002 : 4-8)
identified eightfold areas of conflict be-
tween the Nagas and the Indian state.
First, the Naga political identity has
reached the national level from village/
tribal level. But, India does not accept this
claim. Second, the Nagas are fighting for
their collective rights and the movement
is neither insurgency nor secessionist, but
the government thinks otherwise. Third,
the Nagas are not Indians. Indians and
Nagas are from different sources of origin
and racial stock. Fourth, the Nagas claim
that they are independent people having
lived independently in their own territory
since time immemorial. But, the Indian
state does not recognise this claim. Fifth,
on one hand, India claims that Nagaland
is an integral part of the country by vir-
tue of successor to the British, and on the
other hand, the Nagas maintain that since
the British have left they should be set
free. Sixth, India wants settlement within
the scope of its constitution, but the Nagas
do not accept this constitution. Seventh,
the creation of Nagaland divided the
Nagas. Finally, the Nagas reiterate that
their sovereignty will not be surrender to
any authority and is non-negotiable, but
the government doesn’t want to discuss
on the issue at all.
The government policies and the
counter-insurgency strategies towards the
Nagas consist of military, political and
socio-economic components. The ten-
dency to see the armed conflict as a law
and order problem and the insurgents as
criminals or misguided youth has legiti-
mized the use of force under various spe-
cial laws. The counter-insurgency strate-
gies also sometimes include the use of
divisive tactics to split the armed groups
and use one against the other. When the
use of armed forces achieved a limited
success the other components were used.
Years of conflict virtually compelled
the conflict parties to recognise the im-
portance for negotiated settlements. It has
been widely felt that by agreeing to sus-
pend their military actions the armed
groups virtually expressed their willing-
ness to seek resolution of their grievances
within the scope of the Indian laws. In
official peace processes, the government
is engaged in negotiations with the armed
groups (as well as with other groups) with
the aim of bridging their differences. The
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government and those groups are the par-
ties, and peace is largely defined as some
form of a balance of power between them.
In this process several peace accords
have been signed in the past (listed above).
Unfortunately, these accords have not only
failed but worsened the situation of con-
flict. The success of accords would prima-
rily depend on factors such as the con-
text of the conflict and the role of the lead-
ers. The accords should focus on practi-
cal issues, if so also their success will de-
pend on the availability of the able lead-
ers. Further rushing for accords without
proper ground-work must be avoided, and
the government should refrain from rush-
ing for accords with wrong partners. Past
experiences have shown that the govern-
ment was eager to enter into signing ac-
cords with any group without assessing
their relevance. This gave the impression
that the government is interested only in
signing peace accords, one after another,
without assessing their long-term impact.
Lastly, monitoring of the progress in the
implementation of the provisions of the
accords is another area which requires
special attention. Efforts must also be
made for the involvement of the citizen
groups otherwise peace will always be
seen as some form of a balance of power
between them. Nagaland has a vocal citi-
zen groups which work on the issue of
human rights and cleansing of other so-
cial ills. Beyond that it could be time to
nurture these groups in a way which will
facilitate to fill the existing divide between
the state and the society.
To conclude, one way to satisfy the
aspirations of multiple ethnic groups of
Northeast India while preserving the ter-
ritory of the existing states is the option
to grant non-territorial/cultural au-
tonomy. Such autonomy would be best
suited in ethnically diverse areas as it is
detached from the geographical dimen-
sion. This type of autonomy could be
granted to all members of an ethnic group,
irrespective of their belonging to a certain
administrative boundary. It might include
a legislative body and an executive com-
ponent. The scope of such autonomy
might include religion, culture, language
and other welfare matters. This is not en-
tirely new, but has lost its significance over
the years. A case in point is the Naga Hoho
(Council of Tribal Elders), the highest tra-
ditional body of the Nagas. It is a federa-
tion of all Nagas which works towards
better understanding amongst them and
other communities. Its jurisdiction cov-
ered all areas where the Nagas live. This
model could be used to ease the pressure
for demands based on geographical terri-
tories. A formal recognition of these insti-
tutions as the final authority on at least
some of these ethnic practices would ad-
dress the desire of several ethnic groups
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to demonstrate their independent iden-
tity. As this independent identity would
be asserted in different parts of the coun-
try, and abroad, it could be argued that a
separate state would only limit the eth-
nic identity to a smaller territory (see
Singh and Pani 2012: 121-140).
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Nine-Point Agreement of 194717
(APPENDIX I)
Preamble:
That the right of the Nagas to develop them-
selves according to their freely expressed wishes
is recognized.
1. Judicial:
All cases whether civil or criminal arising
between Nagas in the Naga Hills will be disposed
of by duly constituted Naga Courts according to
Naga customary law or such law as may be in-
troduced with the consent of duly recognized
Naga representative organizations: save that
where a sentence of transportation or death has
been passed there will be a right of appeal to the
Governor.
In cases arising between Nagas and non-
Nagas in (a) Kohima and Mokokchung town
areas, and (b) in the neighbouring plains dis-
tricts, the judge if not a Naga will be assisted by
a Naga assessor.
2. Executive:
The general principle is accepted that what
the Naga Council is prepared to pay for, the Naga
Council should control. This principle will apply
equally to the work done as well as the staff em-
ployed.
While the District Officer will be appointed
at the discretion of the Governor, subdivisions of
the Naga Hills should be administered by a Sub
divisional Council with a full time executive Presi-
dent paid by Naga Council who would be re-
sponsible to the District Officer for all matters
falling within the latter’s responsibility, and to
the Naga Council for all matters falling within
their responsibility.
In regard to: (a) Agriculture - the Naga Council
will exercise all the powers now vested in the
District Officer. (b) C.W.D. – The Naga Council
would take over full control. (c) Education and
Forest Department – The Naga Council is pre-
pared to pay for all the services and staff.
3. Legislative:
That no laws passed by the Provincial or
Central Legislature which would materially af-
fect the terms of this agreement or the religious
practices of the Nagas shall have legal force in
the Naga Hills without the consent of the Naga
Council.
In cases of dispute as to whether any law
did so affect this agreement the matter would
be referred by the Naga Council to the Gover-
nor who would then direct that the law in ques-
tion should not have legal force in the Naga
Hills pending the decision of the Central Gov-
ernment.
4. Land:
That land with all its resources in the Naga
Hills should not be alienated to a non-Naga with-
out the consent of the Naga Council.
5. Taxation:
That the Naga Council will be responsible
for the imposition, collection, and expenditure
of land revenue and house tax and of such other
taxes as may be imposed by the Naga Council.
6. Boundaries:
That present administrative divisions should
be modified so as (1) to bring back into the Naga
17 Source: Bendangjungshi (2011:  272-274).
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Hills District all the forests transferred to the
Sibsagar and Nowgong Districts in the past, and
(2) to bring under one unified administrative
unit as far as possible all Nagas. All the areas so
included would be within the scope of the present
proposed agreement. No areas should be trans-
ferred out of the Naga Hills without the consent
of the Naga Council.
7. Arms Act:
The Deputy Commissioner will act on the
advice of the Naga Council in accordance with
the provisions of the Arms Act.
8. Regulations:
The Chin Hills regulations and the Bengal
Eastern Frontier Regulations will remain in force.
9. Period of Agreement:
The Governor of Assam as the Agent of the
Government of the Indian Union will have a spe-
cial responsibility for a period of 10 years to en-
sure the observance of the agreement, at the end
of this period the Naga Council will be asked
whether they require the above agreement to be
extended for a further period or a new agreement
regarding the future of Naga people arrived at.
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Sixteen-Point Agreement of 196018
(APPENDIX II)
1. The Name: The territories that were hereto-
fore known as the Naga Hills-Tuensang
Areas under the Naga Hills-Tuensang Area
Act, 1957 shall form a state within the In-
dian Union and be here-after known as
Nagaland.
2. The Ministry-in-charge: The Nagaland shall
be under the Minister of External Affairs of
the Government of India.
3. The Governor of Nagaland
3.1 The President of India shall appoint a
Governor for Nagaland and he will
vest with the executive powers of the
Government of Nagaland. He will have
his headquarters in Nagaland.
3.2 His administrative secretariat will be
headed by a Chief Secretary stationed
at the Headquarters with other secre-
tariat staff as necessary.
3.3 The Governor shall have special re-
sponsibility with regard to law and or-
der during the transitional period and
for so long as the law and order situa-
tion continues to remain disturbed on
account of hostile activities. In exer-
cising this special responsibility, the
Governor shall, after consultation with
the Ministry, act in his individual judg-
ment. This special responsibility of the
Governor will cease when normalcy re-
turns.
4. Council of Ministers
4.1 There shall be a council of Ministers
with a chief minister at the head to
assist and advice the Governor in the
exercise of his functions.
4.2 The council of Ministers shall be re-
sponsible to the Naga Legislative As-
sembly.
5. The Legislature
There shall be constituted a Legislative As-
sembly consisting of elected and nominated
members as may be deemed necessary rep-
resenting different tribes. (Further a duly
constituted body of experts may be formed
to examine and determine the principles of
representation on democratic basis.)
6. Representation in Parliament
Two elected members shall represent
Nagaland in the Union Parliament, that is to
say one for the Lok Sabha and the other for
the Rajya Sabha.
7. Acts of Parliament
No Act or Law passed by the Union Parlia-
ment affecting the following provisions shall
have legal force in Nagaland unless specifi-
cally applied to it by a majority vote of the
Naga Legislative Assembly:
7.1 The religious or social practices of the
Nagas.
7.2 Naga customary laws and procedure.
18 Source: Naga Peoples Movement for Human Rights.
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7.3 Civil and criminal justice so far as
these concern decisions according to
Naga customary law.
The existing laws relating to administration
of civil and criminal justice as provided in
the Rules for the Administration of Justice
and Police in the Naga Hills district shall
continue to be in force.
7.4 The ownership and transfer of land
and its resources.
8. Local Self-Government
Each tribe shall have the following units of
rule-making and administrative local bod-
ies to deal with matters concerning the re-
spective tribes’ areas: the Village Council; the
Range Council; and the Tribal Council,
These Councils will also deal with disputes
and case involving breaches of customary
laws and usages.
9. Administration of Justice
9.1 The existing system of administration
of civil and criminal justice shall con-
tinue.
9.2 Appellate Courts;
(a) The District Court-cum-Sessions
Court (for each district), High Court
and Supreme Court of India.
(b) The Naga Tribunal (for the whole
of the Nagaland) in respect of cases
decided according to Customary Law.
10. Administration of Tuensang district
10.1 The Governor shall carry on the ad-
ministration of the Tuensang districts
for a period of 10 (ten) years until such
time when the tribes in the Tuensang
District are capable of shouldering
more responsibility of the advanced
system of administration. The com-
mencement of the ten-year period of
administration will start simultane-
ously with the enforcement of detailed
workings of the constitution in other
parts of the Nagaland.
10.2 Provided further that a Regional
Council shall be formed for Tuensang
district by elected representatives from
all the tribes in Tuensang district, and
the Governor may nominate repre-
sentatives to the Regional Council as
well. The Deputy Commissioner will be
the ex-Officio Chairman of the Coun-
cil. The Regional Council will elect mem-
bers to the Naga Legislative Assembly
to represent Tuensang district.
10.3 Provided further that on the advice of
the Regional Council, steps will be
taken to start various Councils and
Courts, in those areas where the peo-
ple fell themselves capable of estab-
lishing such institutions.
10.4 Provided further no Act or Law
passed by the Naga Legislative Assem-
bly shall be applicable to Tuensang
district unless specifically recom-
mended by the Regional Council.
10.5 Provided further that the Regional
Council shall supervise and guide the
working of the various Councils and
Tribal Courts within Tuensang district
and wherever necessary depute the
local officers to act as Chairman
thereof.
10.6 Provided further those Councils of
such areas inhabited by a mixed popu-
lation or which have not as yet decided
to which specified Tribal Council to be
affiliated to shall be directly under the
Regional Council for the time being.
And at the end of ten years the situa-
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tion will be reviewed and if the people
so desire the period will be further ex-
tended.
11. Financial Assistance from the Government
of India
To supplement the revenues of Nagaland,
there will be need for the Government of
India to pay out to the Consolidation Fund
of India:
11.1 A lump sum each for the year devel-
opment programme in the Nagaland;
and
11.2 A grant-in-aid towards meeting the
cost of administration.
Proposal for the above grants shall be pre-
pared and submitted by the Government of
Nagaland to the Government of India for
their approval. The Governor will have gen-
eral responsibility for ensuring that the funds
made available by the Government of India
are expended for purpose for which they
have been approved.
12. Consolidations of Forest Areas
The delegation wished the following to be
placed on record:
The Naga delegation discussed the question
of the inclusion of the reserve forest and of
contiguous areas inhabited by the Nagas.
They were referred to the provisions in Arti-
cles 3 and 4 of the Constitution, prescribing
the procedure for the transfer of area form
one state to another.
13. Consolidation of contiguous Naga Areas
The delegation wished the following to be
placed on record:
The Naga leaders expressed the wish for the
contiguous areas to join the new state. It will
pointed out to them on behalf of the Gov-
ernment of India that Articles 3 and 4 of the
Constitution provided for increasing the area
of any state, but that it was not possible for
the Government of India to make any com-
mitment in this regard at this stage.
14. Formation of separate Naga Regiment
In order that the Naga people can fulfill their
desire of playing a full role in the defense
forces of India the question of raising a sepa-
rate Naga Regiment should be duly exam-
ined for action.
15. Transitional Period
15.1 On reaching the political settlement
with the Government of India, the
Government of India will prepare a
Bill for such amendment to the Con-
stitution, as may be necessary, in or-
der to implement the decision. The
Draft Bill, before presentation to Par-
liament, will be shown to the delegates
of the NPC.
15.2 There shall be constituted an interim
body with elected representatives from
every tribe, to assist and advise the
Governor in the administration of
Nagaland during the transitional pe-
riod. The tenure of office of the Interim
Body will be 3 (three) years subject to
re-election.
16. Inner Line Regulation
Rules embodied in the Bengal Eastern Fron-
tier Regulation, 1873 shall remain in force
in Nagaland.
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Shillong Accord of 197519
(APPENDIX III)
1. The following representatives of the underground organisations met the Governor of Nagaland,








2. There was a series of four discussions. Some of the discussions were held with the Governor
alone; at other, the Governor was assisted by the two Advisors for Nagaland, Shri M. Ramunny,
and Shri H Zopianga, and Shri M L Kampani, Joint Secretary in the Ministry of Home Affairs.
All the five members of the Liaison Committee, namely Rev. Longri Ao, Dr M Aram, Shri L
Lungalang, Shri Kenneth Kerhuo, and Shri Lungshim Shaiza, participated in the discussions.
3. The following were the outcome of the discussions:
3.1 The representatives of the underground organisations conveyed their decision, of their
own volition, to accept, without condition, the Constitution of India.
3.2 It was agreed that the arms, now underground, would be brought out and deposited at
appointed places. Details for giving effect of this agreement will be worked out between
them and representatives of the government, the security forces, and members of the Liai-
son Committee.
3.3 It was agreed that the representatives of the underground organisations should have
reasonable time to formulate other issues for discussion for final settlement.
Dated, Shillong
November 11, 1975
I Temjenba; S Dahru; Z Ramyo; M Assa; Kevi Yalley (On behalf of the representative of the under-
ground organisations).
&
L P Singh, (On behalf of the Government of India)
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